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Abstract
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has overwhelmingly demonstrated the need to
accurately evaluate the effects of implementing new or altering existing
nonpharmaceutical interventions. Since these interventions applied at the societal level
cannot be evaluated through traditional experimental means, public health officials and
other decision makers must rely on statistical and mathematical epidemiological models.
Nonpharmaceutical interventions are typically focused on contacts between members of
a population, and yet most epidemiological models rely on homogeneous mixing which
has repeatedly been shown to be an unrealistic representation of contact patterns. An
alternative approach is individual based models (IBMs), but these are often time
intensive and computationally expensive to implement, requiring a high degree of
expertise and computational resources. More often, decision makers need to know the
effects of potential public policy decisions in a very short time window using limited
resources. This paper presents an estimation algorithm for an IBM designed to evaluate
nonpharmaceutical interventions. By utilizing recursive relationships, our method can
quickly compute the expected epidemiological outcomes even for large populations
based on any arbitrary contact network. We utilize our methods to evaluate the effects
of relaxing current social distancing measures in Iowa, USA, at various times and to
various degrees. R code for our method is provided in the supplementary material,
thereby allowing others to utilize our approach for other regions.
Introduction
In December 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), was
discovered in Wuhan China [1]. The virus causes the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19), characterized by fever, cough, shortness of breath and other respiratory or
flu-like symptoms. Severe cases can lead to pneumonia, respiratory failure, multi-organ
dysfunction and death [2–4]. Since its discovery, the virus has rapidly moved across the
globe and in March 11th, 2020 the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 to
be a global pandemic. To date, over 4 million cases and nearly 300,000 deaths have
been reported worldwide [5]. Nearly all countries have identified COVID-19 cases, with
over 90 countries reporting greater than a thousand cases and 22 countries having
recorded over a thousand deaths [5]. As the size of the pandemic continues to grow
experts expect COVID-19 will pose a significant threat for many months and potentially
years. Thus, the burden not just to population health, but also the overall healthcare
system, skilled and long-term care, and the global economy are likely to be substantial.
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Given the rapid growth with which COVID-19 has moved across the globe, policy
makers have sought guidance to slow the spread, reduce the severity of the epidemic, or
guide strategies for reopening. Consequently, many infectious disease models have been
developed to forecast the trajectory of the current epidemic and to understand the likely
impact of a range of interventions [6–15]. Models designed to capture certain aspects of
the epidemic (e.g., forecasting mortality) may not be well suited for others (e.g.,
evaluating policy decision making), and so decision makers have increasingly had to
navigate a range of diverse modeling approaches while attempting to find approaches
that can meet the specific nature of a given setting [citeDSMRegIHMEReynolds]. In
short, decision makers need information on the effects of public policy measures on an
epidemic that is both timely and accurate. From a modeler’s perspective, this translates
into a model which is both computationally efficient and which captures salient features
of transmission through a population.
One model which has received much attention from decision makers (e.g., [16]) is
that of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) [6]. The IHME model,
as of April 27, 2020, is a curve fitting approach which makes forecasts based on
mortality rates over time. Curve fitting approaches, however, do not model transmission
or individual actors or settings, and thus have limited use to decision makers weighing
whether to implement or relax nonpharmaceutical interventions.
Many other models have been developed that model disease transmission, but these
too often rely on the assumption of homogeneous mixing, or mass action. For
example, [7] implemented an early forecast for COVID-19 in Hubei, China, using a mass
action compartmental model; [17] developed a compartmental model with homogeneous
mixing which was used to capture the undocumented cases of COVID-19; [18] used a
compartmental model with homogeneous mixing which allowed for time-varying
reproduction number; and two web-based forecasting platforms [8, 9]. Some approaches
have tried to estimate the effect of social distancing measures on COVID-19 such as [19]
which uses a stochastic mass action compartmental model and [20] which used an age
stratified mass action model.
We find it very difficult, however, to trust estimates of interventions aimed at
breaking up contacts when the underlying assumption of how members of the
population contact each other is entirely unrealistic. This mirrors the work of [21] who
wrote, “realistic mixing can be an important factor to consider in order for the models
to provide a reliable assessment of intervention strategies” (p.31). There is a large body
of research showing how in many settings homogeneous mixing is inadequate for
accurately modeling disease dynamics, such as [21–27] (see [23] and [25] for further
reference listings on this). As a recent concrete example, [28] evaluated model
assumptions in the West African Ebola outbreak and stated, “we see that alternative
hypotheses for how EVD spreads, such as homogeneous mixing and nearest neighbor
interactions, provide quantitatively poorer agreement with data” (p.3).
Individual-based models (IBMs) provide a method for capturing heterogeneous
mixing. Examples of these applied to COVID-19 include [29,30]. However, not all IBMs
accurately capture realistic contact networks, such as [citeCovasim2020] which assumes
a Poisson distribution. This misses the profound impact that so-called superspreaders
have on the outbreak [31,32], and that these superspreaders “transmit infection to many
other members of the population, while most infectives do not transmit infections at all
or transmit infections to very few others. This suggests that homogeneous mixing at the
beginning of an epidemic may not be a good approximation”( [27], p.120). These IBMs,
however, come at a steep computational cost and can often necessitate a large time
commitment as well as a high level of expertise to design and code efficiently.
The contribution of this paper is primarily to present a computationally efficient
estimation method for a network-based IBM which can be used for evaluating
May 19, 2020 2/14
nonpharmaceutical interventions such as implementing or lifting social distancing
measures or implementing universal personal protective equipment (PPE). Our second
contribution is to use this method to provide critical information on the effects of
relaxing social distancing measures in Iowa at various times and to various degrees.
Methods
Overview
Our proposed method for modeling disease transmission dynamics through a
susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) model relies on a contact network rather
than mass action assumptions. It focuses on the individuals in the population, but
rather than simulating disease over an individual-based model and averaging the results
to obtain an estimated epidemic curve, our method directly estimates the probability
that a particular individual is infectious at a particular time. Through the use of
recursive relationships, the expected number of infected individuals can be efficiently
computed at each time point. Like all methods, there are strengths and weaknesses.
The strengths of the method include the following. First, it relies on a realistic or
observed contact network. This is in contrast to assumptions of homogeneous mixing, or
that the contact degree distribution is not heavy tailed (e.g., Poisson). This crucially
allows us to capture the effects of superspreaders [31,32], burstiness of the
epidemic [33,34], and other salient features of realistic contact graphs. Second, our
approach explicitly captures the way nonpharmaceutical interventions can affect the
disease transmission through quarantining/social distancing or reducing the risk that a
susceptible-infective contact will lead to a new transmission through, e.g., personal
protective equipment (PPE). Third, our approach is computationally efficient and can
be run for even large populations with limited computing resources. Unlike many other
epidemiological IBMs, our method is easily and quickly deployed (a small R package for
implementing this methodology is provided in the supplementary material). Combining
all three of these strengths, our method allows a user to quickly explore the effects of
public policy changes on social distancing or universal PPE interventions, thereby
providing decision makers a timely method of evaluating, for example, when and to
what degree social distancing measures should be implemented or relaxed.
Our method is limited in that some disease characteristics are simplified in exchange
for more accurate contact patterns and computational efficiency. Specifically, it assumes
that everyone who becomes infected experiences a constant latent period and is able to
transmit the disease to their set of regular contacts (either directly or through the
environment) for the same amount of time. While these quantities can be estimated
from the data, it does not reflect the varying lengths of time individuals are susceptible
nor the varying lengths of time individuals are infectious before recovering, dying, or
being effectively isolated.
Approach
We begin by presenting the setup and notation we will use. For a population of size N ,
let the initial probability that an individual is infected be denoted as p0. For
j = 1, 2, . . . , N , let xtj = 1 if individual j is infective at time t, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , and 0
otherwise. The probability that xtj = 1, E(xtj), is denoted by xˆtj . The N individuals in
the population are connected through a contact graph which is represented by a N ×N
adjacency matrix A such that Aij = 1 if i and j can contact each other and 0 otherwise.
The probability that a susceptible individual j is infected by an infective neighbor on
the contact graph at time t is denoted by pt. If this event occurs, the susceptible enters
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a latent period of DE days where they have been exposed but are not yet infectious.
This latent period is immediately followed by a period of DI days where the individual
is infective, and hence
∑
t xtj = D ∀j. Let It denote the set of infectives at time t, and
let Nj denote the neighbors of j on the contact graph. At time t, let Qtj denote the
event that susceptible individual j is self-quarantining, and let this event occur with
probability qtj . Let ι denote the daily probability of a susceptible individual importing
the disease from outside the population of interest. Finally, let Htj denote the event that
j is successfully infected at time t (and hence will enter the latent period for DE days),
where H0j corresponds to the event that j is the outbreak’s initializer/patient zero.
The goal of the analysis is to estimate the expected number of new infections each
day- or equivalently each day’s expected cumulative number of infections- according to
the individual-based model described above. To achieve this, we first focus on
estimating the probability of being infective for each individual in the population on
each day, i.e., xˆtj .
For the first few days of the outbreak, the only infective(s) will be the outbreak
initializer(s). If the latent period is longer than the infectious period then there will be
one or more days with zero infectives. If the opposite is true (DE < DI), then following
these first few days there will be a period where the probability an individual is
infective equals the probability that they are either the outbreak initializer or were
infected within the first t−DE days. After this, the probability that an individual is
infective equals the probability that they were not an initializer and were infected
within a moving window such that they have passed the latent period but have not yet
recovered. To put this concretely in mathematical terms, we have the following. For
1 ≤ t ≤ min(DE , DI),
xˆtj = p0. (1)
If DE > DI , then for DI < t ≤ DE ,
xˆtj = 0, (2)
else if DE < DI , then for DE < t ≤ DI ,
xˆtj = Prob
(
t−DE⋃
s=0
Hsj
)
. (3)
Finally, we have for t > max(DI , DE),
xˆtj = Prob

max(0,t−DE−DI)⋂
s=0
H ′sj
 ∩

t−DE⋃
s=max(1,t−DE−Di+1)
Hsj

 . (4)
If individual j is still susceptible at time t, they can become infected by either
importing the disease from outside of the study population or by being infected by an
infective neighbor on the contact graph. This latter method requires both that j is not
quarantined at time t and that at least one infective neighbor infects j. Hence by the
law of total expectation we have that
Prob
(
Htj
∣∣∣ ⋂
s<t
H ′sj
)
= ι+ (1− ι)(1− qtj)
(
1− E(Prob(no infectives infect j|Q′sj ,xt)
)
= ι+ (1− ι)(1− qtj)
1− E
 ∏
i∈Nj∩It
(1− pt)

= ι+ (1− ι)(1− qtj)
(
1− E
(
(1− pt)x′tA·j
))
,
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where xt = (xt1, xt2, . . . , xtN )
′ and A·j is the jth column of the adjacency matrix A.
Using a first order Taylor’s expansion around xˆt, we have
Prob
(
Htj
∣∣∣ ⋂
s<t
H ′sj
)
≈ ι+ (1− ι)(1− qtj)
(
1− E
(
(1− p)xˆ′tA·j + (xt − xˆt)′∇
{
(1− pt)x′tA·j
}∣∣∣
xt=xˆt
))
,
= ι+ (1− ι)(1− qtj)
(
1− (1− p)xˆ′tA·j
)
, (5)
or equivalently
Prob
(
H ′tj
∣∣∣ ⋂
s<t
H ′sj
)
≈ (1− ι)
(
qt + (1− qt)(1− pt)xˆ′tA·j
)
. (6)
For ease of notation, we let this quantity in (6) be notated as ftj .
Combining Eq (1)-(6) yields the following.
1 < t ≤ min(DE , DI), xˆtj = p0,
min(DE , DI) < t ≤ max(DE , DI), xˆtj =
{
1− (1− p0)
∏t−DE
s=1 fsj if DE < DI
0 if DE > DI
t > max(DE , DI) xˆtj = αmax(0,t−DE−DI)j
1− t−DE∏
s=max(1,t−DE−Di+1)
fsj
 .
(7)
Here αtj is defined to be the probability that individual j is still susceptible by time t.
These quantities can be computed recursively in the following manner. First,
α0j := Prob(H
′
0j) = 1− p0. Subsequently for t > 0 we have
αtj := Prob
(
t⋂
s=0
H ′sj
)
= α(t−1)jftj . (8)
These recursions then allow us to compute the quantity of interest, namely the
number of infections we expect to have by time t. This is derived from the expected
number of susceptible individuals:
E(# infected) = Pop. size − E(# susceptible)
= N −
N∑
j=1
αtj . (9)
The parameters to be estimated include the length of the disease’s latent period
(DE), the number of days an individual is infective (DI), the probabilities that a
contact leads to a transmission event (pt), and the probabilities that an individual is
quarantined at time t (qt). The initial probability p0 may also need to be estimated, but
in many cases this will be a known (small) number, such as 1/N for a single initializer.
Given a contact graph, prior to social distancing and any intervention which may affect
transmission probabilities the quantities pt may be related to the more intuitive
reproduction number, or R0, defined to be the expected number of new infections
generated by a given infective. This can be computed as
R0 = (# days infectious)×E(# contacts per day)×Prob(S-I contact leads to new transmission),
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and hence
pt =
R0
Dd¯
, (10)
where d¯ is the average degree in the contact graph A, i.e., the average number of
neighbors in A. Estimation can be performed via ordinary least squares (OLS), i.e.,
minimizing the sum of squared differences between the observed and the expected
number of daily cases.
COVID-19 in Iowa
Case Data
We used publicly available data collected by the Center for Systems Science and
Engineering at Johns Hopkins University [5] for the state of Iowa. It has been widely
regarded that mortality data, while still flawed, presents a much more reliable indicator
for the prevalence of COVID-19. We took the number of daily deaths in Iowa current
up to May 7, 2020 and used this to estimate the daily number of new infections. This
was done in two steps: (1) smoothing the mortality data, and (2) converting this to
number of infections.
First, we took the daily number of deaths and estimated the expected number of
individuals with symptom onsets on each day. This was done by leveraging work by [35]
who estimated the time between symptom onset and death (which we will henceforth
refer to as SO-Death lag). We matched their results to a negative binomial distribution
with a mean of 16.1 days and dispersion parameter equal to 183. Given a maximum
SO-Death lag L and a certain number of deaths on day t, call it yt, we can consider
each death as a draw from a multinomial distribution where the bins are the preceding
L days. Further, from [35] we know the probability that a given case will fall in a
certain bin (i.e., day). Hence we have a random variable n(t) such that
n(t) ∼ Multinom(yt,pit),
pit` := Prob(SO-Death lag = `), ` = 0, 1, . . . , L,
where Prob(SO-Death lag = `) is from the negative binomial distribution described
above. For each t we can compute E(n(t), and then for each day s add the contributed
counts from the concurrent day n(s) and each future day n(t) to obtain the expected
number of individuals whose symptoms began on day s.
To estimate the number of new infections each day, we combined the smoothed
mortality data with the infection fatality rate (IFR) estimated at 0.5% by [36] which
used data collected from the Diamond Princess cruise ship outbreak. That is, we took
the estimated number of new infections each day that would eventually result in a
mortality event and scaled by 1/0.005 to obtain the total number of infections. Figure 1
shows the raw daily mortality data as well as the estimated number of new infections as
measured by symptom onset.
When training our model we shifted these dates back by four days, as this has been
the estimated length of the incubation period [35,37]. In addition, due to the lag
between becoming infected and death, the tail of the data is not reliable. We thus
trained our model after excluding the last 27 days, which corresponds to the 99th
percentile of the SO-Death lag distribution. This point is marked by a vertical gray line
in Figure 1.
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Fig 1. Raw daily mortality (dashed red) data for Iowa, and estimated number of new
infections (solid black). The left axis corresponds to the number of new infections
eventually leading to death while the right axis corresponds to the estimated total
number of new daily infections. The vertical gray line corresponds to the cutoff point
used to train our IBM. (Color online.)
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Contact graph
[38] recruited 1450 individuals from 857 households in Hong Kong into a study on
inter-personal contacts, where a contact was defined to be a social encounter which
included a “face-to-face conversation or touch (such as handshake, a kiss, games and
sports or similar events involving body touch).” As was consistent with other
studies, [38] found the distribution of contacts to be heavy tailed, which has profound
effects in the context of infectious disease as this indicates potential super-spreaders.
Overall, individuals had on average 12.5 contacts per day. This matches closely with an
ecological momentary assessment study of individuals in upstate New York which found
the average number of daily contacts to be 12 [39]. We therefore constructed a contact
graph for the ∼ 3.155M Iowans with a degree distribution which resembled that of [38].
Scenarios
We trained our model on the available data, and used this model to forecast into the
future under several scenarios. First, we investigated the effects of reopening at certain
stages. Reopening was set to occur adaptively such that if the number of daily
infections dropped below a certain proportion of the peak, social distancing measures
would be relaxed. Since this relaxation is not likely to occur immediately, we set the
quarantine probability to decay according to a Gaussian kernel such that after two
weeks the current levels of social distancing/quarantining levels were reduced by 90%.
Second, we investigated the effects of reopening for only a portion of the population.
This was determined by maintaining the current level of quarantining for those
individuals with the highest number of contacts (e.g., healthcare professionals rotating
between long term care facilities) while lifting social distancing measures for the
remainder of the population.
Results
By May 11, 2020, we had records of 265 deaths in Iowa due to COVID-19 infections.
We trained our data on the resulting estimates of daily infections, although due to the
long delays between infection and death, our training data are effectively only valid up
to April 11, 2020. Based on this, the peak of the current trajectory is estimated to
occur around May 28, 2020, although this too will change as social distancing measures
are being relaxed throughout parts of the states as of May 1, 2020. The latent period
was estimated to be 3 days, which is in line with previous estimates. The infectious
period was estimated to be 5 days. While this is considerably shorter than what is
currently believed to be the time from symptom onset to recovery (e.g., [40] estimated
this to be between 19 and 23 days depending on age), this is close to what has been
previously estimated to be the time between symptom onset and isolation; [40]
estimated this to be 4.6 days, and [41] estimated this to be 2.9 days. The probability
that an individual is quarantined past March 15 (this is the date that the governor of
Iowa recommended closing schools and limiting large gatherings [42]) was estimated to
be 0.48. The daily importation probability was estimated at 4.5× 10−6; and the basic
reproduction number R0 prior to social distancing was estimated to be 1.3, which
translates into a probability that a susceptible-infective contact leads to a new
transmission event near 0.02. Figure 2 shows the estimated epicurve to the number of
infections both on a daily basis and as a cumulative count.
We estimated the mean number of daily new infections when social distancing is
relaxed when the number of new infections is at 95%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 5% of the
peak number of daily new infections. We then considered the effects of reimplementing
the current social distancing measures after 10 days of steady increases in cases. Finally,
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Fig 2. Fitting the individual-based model (gray solid) to the daily (left) and
cumulative (right) number of infections (black dashed) based on dates of symptom
onset. Color online.
we considered how the number of infections changes as we allow only the lower 90%,
80%, and 50% of individuals sorted by number of contacts to relax social distancing
measures while maintaining the current level of social distancing for the remaining
individuals.
Figures 3 and 4 show the estimated epicurves based on the varying criteria for
reopening (in terms of % of peak), the two potential responses (reinstate social
distancing or remain open), and the various subpopulations allowed to relax social
distancing.
Discussion
We have provided a method for capturing realistic transmission throughout a
population while achieving computational efficiency. This allows decision makers to
receive timely and accurate estimates of a range of nonpharmaceutical interventions.
There are several key takeaways from our analysis of COVID-19 in Iowa. First, while
reopening at only 95% or 75% of the peak typically leads to an even higher second peak,
waiting just a little longer leads to a milder second peak in all cases except when social
distancing is relaxed for all individuals. Second, in many cases there is not a dramatic
difference in reinstating social distancing and allowing society to remain opened. Third,
as expected, by relaxing social distancing for only a subpopulation, the second peaks are
reduced, and in the case of relaxing only a strategic half of the population, the effects of
reopening are minimal.
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